Ft Washington Captured- Washington Retreats Through N. J.-1776
The British captured Fort Washington on Northern Manhattan Island on November 16, 1776, without much difficulty. Washington proceeded into New Jersey. He was pursued by Howe all the way south until he successfully crossed the Delaware River.
The Americans tried to block the British from using the Hudson River by building two forts. The first fort was built in Washington Heights, which is the highest point in Manhattan. The second fort was built in Lee, New Jersey. The second fort became known as Ft. Lee. To their dismay, having these two forts were unable to stop British ships from traversing the Hudson below them. Washington was forced to first move his army off of Manhattan and then to retreat to NJ. After his defeat in White Plains, General Washington gave serious consideration to abandoning Ft. Washington. Though, the forts commander, Colonel Robert Magaw, as well as the American commander in the area, General Nathaniel Greene, recommended that the fort be retained. Magaw and Greene believed that it would very difficult for the British to capture the fort Washington.
Washington was not able to make a final decision on whether to withdraw the troops. However, on November 16th that decision was taken from Washington, when the British troop attacked the Americans at dawn. American troops created a defensive line outside the fort, where the majority of American troops were deployed. The Americans fought hard, but the 13,000 British troops overwhelmed the 3,000 US defenders. A total of 149 Americans werer killed or wounded in the attack. The British lost 458 soldiers, who were either killed, wounded, or missing in action. At the end of the first stage of the battle, the British brought up cannons and offered the Americans the option of surrendering. Magaw felt he had no choice, but to surrender. As a result, 2,870 Americans became prisoners of war.
The British quickly conquered Ft. The Americans abandoned the Ft. Lee without a fight. They left despite the fort's prime location (on the top of the Palisades cliffs) and the fact that Ft. Lee was filled precious arms that were not evacuated.
Then, Washington's army began a headlong retreat through New Jersey. It took the army 16 days until it had travelled through all of New Jersey. When they reached the Delaware River they crossed that as well. The American army was disheartened. The Americans were forced to give up New York City and all of New Jersey. However, the army was still intact. General Howe failed in his pursuit to stop the American army before it could reach safety.
Retreat Through NJ - History
New Jersey is called the crossroads of the American Revolution, because it held a key geographical position at the center of the new nation, and the armies were in or crossing it throughout the war. It was heavily involved in the fighting, due to the troop movements through the state, and its key geographic position between New York City and Philadelphia. New Jersey had more engagements than any other state during the war, closely followed by South Carolina.
Major actions in the state include:
Washington's troops crossed NJ from NY in 1776, chased by the British after the fall of NY to the British . In late Dec, 1776 to mid Jan 1777, he in turn chased the British out of most of NJ. See THE BATTLES OF TRENTON and PRINCETON, and the NJ Militia during the Revolution. November through December, 1776, is called the Crisis of the Revolution because it seemed the American army could not stand against the British, and the support for the Revolution came to a low ebb, until Washington reversed the military and political situation by the victories in Trenton and Princeton. During the Crisis, NJ, like many states, did not always perform well. The militia in large part refused to turn out to fight with Washington, many began to refuse to accept Continental paper money, and hundreds a day went to the British to sign allegiance papers. Much of this was caused by the poor showing of the Army, which had performed sometimes poorly in the Battles for New York. All the states at that time found support for the revolution decreasing. Still, some militia men resisted the British, such as the ones who ambushed Cornet Geary and his dragoons, south of Flemington, in mid Dec. of 1776. After these battles, the militia came out strong and defended the state well-see The Battle of Millstone for an example of what they did after the Battle of Princeton.
Many people at the time in NJ were "disaffected" as they called it- Tories and loyalist who supported the King. The revolution was actually a civil war, neighbor against neighbor, and it took years after the war to settle the old hatreds. The patriots looted the Tories, raided their strongholds, confiscated their lands, homes and businesses under the treason acts. The Loyalists returned the treatment whenever possible,and paid them back with interest, and passed information to the British about the rebels. Sometimes a father would have one son in one army and an other in the opposing camp in an effort to play both sides and keep his property no matter what the outcome of the war.
The British and their Hessian troops who entered the state to crush the rebellion were brutal in their habits, stealing, looting and raping, both patriots and loyalist. This later worked against them, since it seemed to many Jerseyians better to have local leaders than to trust to British protection after that horrible experience.
In the fall of 1777, the Lower Delaware River was held for a time against the British fleet from the Jersey shore, in the Delaware River Defense at Forts Mifflin and Mercer. In 1778 when the British abandoned Philadelphia, they crossed through NJ again, and Washington engaged them, and won, at Monmouth Court House.
The American army spent two winters at Morristown (see the Morristown site)(see the NPS site:Jockey Hollow National Park) in 1777, and again in 1779-80. Washington passed the winter of '78-'79 in MIDDLEBROOK, between Somerville and Bound Brook. In the winter of '81-82, some units were again posted at Morristown, and the lack of pay and supplies lead to two mutinies, one by the Pennsylvania troops there, and one by the NJ troops in Elizabethtown. Many times various armies passed through the state, on the way to New York, or Philadelphia, or upstate New York. The French allies marched through with the American forces on the way to Yorktown, and again on the way to New England to ship home.
In an attempt to open the route to Washington in the Watchung mountains in July of 1780, The British attacked the Americans around Springfield twice, the 2nd being one of the larger, but least mentioned battles of the war. The British were stopped at the foothills, and the Americans never understood what they hoped to accomplish. At this battle the militia came out strongly to support Washington's troops and were an important factor in the British withdrawal. This was the last of the battles between the armies in NJ. Raids continued throughout the war, especially by Loyalists from British held Staten Island and New York City.
Raids by loyalist units and from British held Staten Island, and against them in return, were common throughout the war. See Poor Twist- the death of a soldier. After the battle of Yorktown in Virginia, the regular troops just watched each other, but the bitter struggle between loyalist and patriot groups continued, and the hatred between sides remained high even after the war.
NJ made important contributions of war material such as raw iron and worked iron, including field pieces, muskets, and shot, salt, gunpowder, and cloth. Manufacturing had been prohibited by the British, and these were new and vital industries that were started.
New Jersey has a long sea coast with many small bays and small ports. During the Revolution they became important points for shipping since NYC was held by the British, and Philadelphia was held for a time. Both commercial shipping and privateers out to capture British shipping based themselves in NJ, and British losses to NJ privateers was a constant sore spot. Occasionally, the British would raid a small port, or supply loyalist units from one. Ships were built along the ocean and Delaware rivers for use against the British. The fighting force of the United States fleet, and State ships was small, but the effect of the commerce raiding on British merchantmen was an important factor in winning the war. Many sea battles were fought in N.J. ocean waters. The small towns along the shore were raided much like the Neutral Ground. They were accessible by water, provided various materials to the revolution, such as salt, and raided the British, so were targeted.
Through the war, with New York City held by the British, the surrounding areas near water were "The Neutral Ground", a no-mans land held by neither side and raided by both. The Americans could only patrol the area and post sentries to warn of attacks by British and Tory troops. They could not prevent the enemy excursions. The civil war in these areas- along the Hudson River and coast to Sandy Hook-were brutal, with neighbor raiding neighbor, assisted by the armed forces of both sides. Both sides thought of the other as little better than murderous thieves. See an example from south Jersey- The Pine Tree Robbers.
In June of 1780, with the troops at Jockey Hollow in very low morale, the British launched an attack towards Morristown, and were held first at Connecticut Farms, (now Union) and then at Springfield. This was the last major action in the north during the war. See The Battles of Connecticut Farms and Springfield
The last local fighting of the war was done by raiding Tories from New York City against the Americans in the surrounding areas, especially in NJ. The British finally stopped supporting the raiders when they murdered an American prisoner taken from a NYC prison, a Captain Joshua Huddy of Monmouth County. Washington ordered a lottery of British Captains to chose one to hang in return, and a Capt. Asgill was selected. Congress supported and reinforced the decision. Washington bargained for the murderers for Asgill, but the British refused to turn them over. They held a trial of the officer responsible, who was found Not Guilty, as he was under orders of the Loyalist Council, a group of high ranking loyalist in New York. The British broke up the Loyalist group and sent most to England. Washington, the war almost over, had no reason or desire to hang Asgill, but could not get Congress to order his release. Finally Lady Asgill, the Captains mother, wrote to King Louis XVI of France and begged for her sons life. The French minister sent a request to Washington to release the boy, and Washington was able to push Congress into acting to release him.
Finally the war petered out to an end. On April 14th, 1783 Governor William Livingston announced the End of the War. No offical hostilities occured after this, but Loyalist were still a problem, even after the war, and the militia still had to keep an eye on the British in New York City until late Novemeber, 1783 when the British handed over first Manhattan, then Staten Island, and took ship for Britian.
See The sufferings of a Continental soldier to understand the difficulties, and hardships faced by the American soldiers of the Revolution.
REVWAR '75 has several articles by John Rees on the NJ Continental Line, and has many other online resources. John Rees also has a HISTORY OF THE NEW JERSEY LINE .
The New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, Geographic section, sells a map of NJ battles during the Revolution, $5.00, which is helpful. Also see my History links page.
Turning Points- An Easter Reflection
When I do a talk on the liturgy, and especially on Eucharist or on the Church year, I usually begin by asking the participants to reflect silently for a few minutes on some significant turning point in their lives. I don’t ask them to share their turning points, but I do ask them to consider that a real turning point has three qualities: 1) it takes you irrevocably from an old life to a new life 2) it grows as time passes, taking on new and deeper meaning 3) it can be celebrated over and over, perhaps publicly, always personally, even if the celebration is simply the memory that “on this day…..(fill in the blank) happened.”
What we celebrate today, on Easter Sunday, is the culmination of the last four days, beginning with the Mass of the Lord’s Supper on Holy Thursday, continuing through the Liturgy of the Lord’s Passion on Good Friday, moving quietly through the seeming emptiness of Holy Saturday, and finally climaxing at the Easter Vigil and Easter Sunday celebrations. We celebrate our own Passover in the passing of Jesus through death to new, resurrected life, as we renew our baptismal commitment. If we reside in a parish, we have the delightful opportunity to witness the initiation of new members into the Christian community – a turning point for them, and a renewal of our own.
Easter marks the definitive turning point not only for each of us as fully initiated Christians, but for the history of the world…whether the world knows it or not. The Resurrection of Jesus changed everything, permanently and irrevocably. The question is how deeply we are willing to enter into the ongoing process of that change.
As we delight in the fragrance of Easter lilies, the spring song of birds, the enjoyment (even if socially-distanced) of the company of others at festive liturgies and meals, let’s remember that this turning point is serious. It’s taken us to a new life its meaning increases and challenges us day by day it invites us to celebrate it again and again, not only during this sacred time of the year, but every day as we try to nudge our pandemic-weary world to something newer and better. Perhaps we are all being invited to lives that are quieter, simpler, more contented with the here-and-now, more aware that everything we do has an impact on everything and everyone else. We are gifted with Jesus’ new life so that we can in turn pass, with Jesus, in a daily dying-and-rising that enlarges our spirits and invites God’s beloved world to the same new life.
Washington Crossing the Hackensack: One man's journey retracing the 'Retreat to Victory'
FORT LEE — In November, as the winter chill is setting in, General George Washington's army is retreating from the Palisades cliffs and into New Jersey, toward the Hackensack River.
An ambush from the British has forced them to abandon Fort Lee, and they're headed south, for Trenton. The wounded will go to Morristown.
Robert Sullivan, an author and journalist, is nearby, at a Starbucks, getting provisions and studying a map prepared by Robert Erskine, Washington's surveyor general, that he downloaded off the Internet.
"It's all still here," he says. "The landscape really has it. You don't need to make anything up, you don't have to dress up — though I'm not against dressing up — but the landscape already has it."
Sullivan is retreating, too. He'll follow the path the Continental Army took from Fort Lee into Leonia, around that "impassable swamp" of the Meadowlands and across the Hackensack. The author of several books about New York and New Jersey, his newest, "My American Revolution," probes the hidden history of the War of Independence in the region.
His works, among them 1998's "The Meadowlands," unravel the complicated relationship we have with the landscapes around us. He achieves this by exploring those landscapes, by car, by boat and most often, on foot. Today he is charting new territory, though. He's tweeting his retreat.
"First view of the Watchung Mountains & the Meadowlands!" he punches into his phone, a "dumb phone," as we walk down Fort Lee Road toward Leonia. "An ancient vista!"
Cross the Delaware in a boat in the winter? Doable. Cross Ivy Lane on Liberty Road in Teaneck on foot? Good luck!&mdash Robert Sullivan (@RESullivanJr) November 14, 2012
"It turns out this is what Twitter was invented for," he says aloud, passing beneath the Route 46 overpass.
The path Washington's army took is as practical today as it was in 1776. He'll travel beneath 46, the New Jersey Turnpike and across Route 4 in Englewood, a route familiar to commuters and increasingly harrowing for pedestrians, and then head north, looping around the Meadowlands.
"When you're in a car, yeah you know there's a hill and stuff, but you really don't pay attention the way you do when you walk," Sullivan says. "When you walk, you really are one with that landscape. But you rarely see people walking these paths. There's never really anybody out. And the cops kind of circle you. I can't blame them."
Robert Sullivan explains the significance of the path he's following along Bergen County's sidewalks and highways toward the Hackensack river.
Descending Fort Lee Road, he looks to those mountains in the distance, where the Americans will seek the refuge of high ground and the British will try to rout them out. This march is known as the Continental Army's "Retreat to Victory," and it happened right around this time 236 years ago, the same pre-dawn Morning Star hanging over General Washington and the writer who ambled after him.
This is a history we drive past every morning, headed over the George Washington Bridge into New York, but it's not entirely forgotten. This weekend, more than a dozen living history groups will recreate the British Invasion of New Jersey in the bridge's shadow. Costumed Continentals, militiamen, British soldiers and Hessions will do battle on the Palisades. Sullivan is decidedly pro-reenactment they're an exciting way for people to engage with this history, he says.
"But here's this other idea: How about after the battle? Or before the battle, or after they're chased out of New York and Fort Lee and they run, they leave their cooking pots behind, and they march," he says. "So you sit there and you say, 'Wow, there's no HBO special on the boring trudge.' But it seems like that's the bulk of the war."
The Lamington Farm Estate
Just south of the Lamington section of Bedminster Township lies one of the finest pieces of real estate in Bedminster dating back to the 1600’s. The Duyckinck family, a Dutch farming family, lived on the Lamington Farm property through the early 1900’s, living in what was know as the “Old Dutch House”. The family made cider with their own presses from apples from their orchard. They raised cattle and sheep. Legend has it there’s a ghost in the house. John Duyckinck, possibly a British sympathizer was confined to live within the boundaries of the property after being jailed and exiled by General George Washington in 1779. The Continental Army’s artillery was stationed in Bedminster, in the Pluckemin Village section of Bedminster during the winter of 1778-1779 under the leadership of General Henry Knox.It is still unclear if Duyckinck was a Revolutionary War hero, or a British spy, but past residents claim to have heard the sounds of a man in riding boots echoing in the stairwells.Above is the original Lamington House built near the site of the original earlier house of the Duycknick family, which had owned parts of what became the Cowperthwaite estate since the 18th century. Source: The Somerset Hills Vol.2.
Cowperthwaithe Family – Lamington House (#summerwhitehouse)
In 1917, the property was purchased by the Morgan Cowperthwaite family. The original house was designed by New York architect James Cameron Mackenzie who had previously designed the Gambrill estate in Peapack. In 1939, architect Mott B. Schmidt of New York City was commissioned by John K. Cowperthwaite, Morgan’s son, to build the Cowperthwaite residence. Schmidt was an architect who also constructed Gracie Mansion’s Susan B. Wagner wing, Sutton Place and homes for the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts. The Cowperthwaithe’s called it Lamington House.
Above Image: The Lamington House was built in 1939 on the same site as the original Duyckinck house. The home was designed by renowned architect Mott B.Schmidt. President Trump’s Summer White House actually looked like the White House in 1939.
Photo Credit: The Somerset Hills Volume 2
The Bedminster area is part of what’s known as the Somerset Hills and had become a popular equestrian and hunting area in the late 1800s. As fox hunting grew, Charles Pfizer moved the historic Essex Hunt Club from Montclair, New Jersey to Peapack, New Jersey. Trails were integrated into the Hamilton Far and Lamington Farms properties. The family also raised cattle on the estate, noted as being some of the finest in the area.
Jock Cowperthwaite maintained the estate until John DeLorean purchased it in 1981. John DeLorean bought what was then 433 acres along with the Georgian-style red brick manor house for $3.5 million. DeLorean and his former wife, model/actress Cristina Ferrare lived there for 19 years.
In 1978 DeLorean left General Motors to start the DeLorean Motor Company. where he built his dream car, the DMC-12, made famous in Stephen Spielberg’s 1985 movie Back to the Future. With a $25,000 price tag, the car didn’t sell well. The car was cult phenom.
Then on October 19, 1982, John Z. DeLorean was arrested and charged with conspiracy to obtain and distribute 55 pounds of cocaine. What most people don’t remember is that DeLorean was acquitted of the drug charges in August 1984 stating that DeLorean was entrapped by the FBI. It was the company’s financial trouble that made DeLorean an easy drug target for the FBI’s $24 million drug deal. Investments up to $175 million basically tanked the company due to modest reviews of the car.
In 1999, DeLorean declared bankruptcy and put his Bedminster estate up for sale. Rumor had it that before the FBI came to seize DeLorean’s property he burried all over his property. When Trump’s Golf Club property was being excavated, nothing turned up. But it still remains a local rumor.
While living in the house rumor had it that Delorean’s adopted son Zachery, having a father that designed the Chevrolet Firebird ,Vega, the Pontiac Grand Prix, and GTO didn’t seem to phase him. On the other hand it seemed to embolden him. Rumor has it that while father John returned from a business trip he ventured upstairs to see his son. After knocking on the door he entered the teens room only to find a full sized poster of a Ford Mustang on his wall. A blasphemous act, John had a working relationship with Lee Iacocca, the Ford mustang designer. But as parents know, you just need to know what fights to defend. The door shut and the poster stayed.
By 2000, DeLorean’s estate expanded to 506-acres. On the western side lies Cowperthwaite Road, named after the second property owners, the Cowperthwaite family. Trump bought the property from National Fairways in 2000, a minority partner of Lamington Farm Club LLC (now Trump National Golf Club), a Connecticut-based golf course developer that had acquired it at a bankruptcy auction in early 2000. Bedminster Township in August 2001 approved Donald Trump’s property for use as a golf course and country club.
The red brick Lamington House became Trump National’s clubhouse and 11 single-family cottages were planned for extensive renovations around a planned pool and bistro complex. The Tom Fazio designed golf course was opened in 2004. Located a short distance from the clubhouse in a separate “village”, there’s a 25-yard long swimming pool, hot tubs,spa and fitness center, tennis courts, paddle tennis,basketball court, equestrian riding trails and of course, a heliport. Located next to the clubhouse and across from the pro shop, ” locker area was located and is now the ladies’ locker room the men’s locker room having been relocated above the golf pro shop. The golf shop was DeLorean’s former garage. In 2007, permits and plans were submitted to the Bedminster Land Use Board for a cemetery on the property just off the 1st hole on the golf course along with 10 family plots. The permit was approved via Resolution 2013-16.
In 2006, struggles over planning and “gray water” issues led to the hiring of Edward Russo, the former Bedminster Planning Board Chairman. Russo worked diligently as a consultant and acted as an environmental consultant for the Trump project in Bedmnister. News articles have labeled him “Trumps Environmental Evangelist”. Russo was hired by National Fairways in 2000 and Trump continued his consultancy until this day.
To drop everything for a weekend, and spend time in solitude (and maybe silence!), prayer and reflection is the perfect antidote to our busy, distracted lives. As we look forward to a frenetic holiday season, with Thanksgiving around the corner, this may be the perfect time for a spiritual retreat. If things are a little too busy now, consider scheduling a retreat for after Christmas, when you are ready to make the most of it.
Spiritual retreats are not just for priest and religious. In fact, the United States Council of Catholic Bishops urges lay people to take advantage of opportunities to go on a retreat: “In the midst of your busy lives, a retreat opportunity affords you time of silence and clarity that cannot be found in the world.”
These 12 Catholic retreat centers offer all that, and more – each is a beautiful setting that will inspire you and put you in the perfect frame of mind a fruitful spiritual repose.
Eastern Point Retreat House
Located in an old stone mansion overlooking the Atlantic Ocean, the Eastern Point Retreat House offers Jesuit retreats based on the exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola.
Courtesy of New Camaldoli Hermitage
Since 1958, the monks of New Camaldoli Hermitage, have welcomed guests to experience the peace their location, overlooking the Pacific Ocean affords their Benedictine community every day. [Note: Due to extensive repairs to Highway 1 necessitated by a major rockslide, access to the Hermitage is currently somewhat limited, but they are welcoming guests again.]
Courtesy of The Shrine of Saint Therese of Lisieux
At this national shrine operated by the Catholic Diocese of Alaska, retreatants come to enjoy the natural beauty of the oceanside location, and the freedom from modern distractions. Depending on their preference, guests can stay in log cabins or a small hermitage with no running water or electricity.
4. The Monastery of Bethlehem in Sullivan County, New York
Courtesy of Monastery of Bethlehem
Located in the Catskill Mountains two and a half hours from New York City, the Monastery of Bethlehem offers beauty, silence and solitude from its location amidst acres of forest. “The colors of the hills and the stillness of the lakes offer rest and relief to weary spirits,” promise the monastic sisters who operated the retreat center.
5. St. Joseph’s Abbey in Spencer, Massachusetts
Courtesy of Saint Joseph's Abbey
The community of Trappist monks at St. Joseph’s Abbey invites guests to get a taste of the monastic life at this beautiful bucolic setting. Retreatants are welcome to join the monks for the Liturgy of the Hours and for Mass, and at conferences given by the monks.
6. Cormaria in Sag Harbor, New York
Courtesy of Cormaria
Cormaria is a Catholic Retreat House set on 18 waterfront acres in the historic whaling village of Sag Harbor, New York. The Religious of the Sacred Heart of Mary consider inclusive hospitality their vocation and invite guests of all denominations to “come away and rest a while.”
Courtesy of Villa Maria del Mar
Villa Maria del Mar, a beachfront property overlooking Monterey Bay in the Pacific Ocean, is owned and operated by the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.
Courtesy of Serra Retreat
Located on top of a 26-acre knoll in Malibu, overlooking the Pacific Ocean, and with views of the Santa Monica Mountains, the Serra Retreat is a place of uncommon beauty. Operated by the Franciscan Friars, the retreat center offers private retreats and themed retreats, including those based on the 12-step recovery program.
Courtesy of Loyola on The Potomac
This Jesuit retreat house overlooks the Potomac River and is surrounded by 235 acres of rolling woodland. Ignatian weekend retreats are available.
Courtesy of Our Lady of the Oaks
Guests at the Jesuit-run Our Lady of Oaks Retreat House enjoy sitting in the shade provided by old oak trees in the central courtyard of the beautiful Spanish mission style estate. Retreats are based on St. Ignatius’ spiritual exercises.
Founded by monks from Einsiedeln Abbey in Switzerland in 1854, Saint Meinrad Archabbey offers a beautiful and tranquil spot for prayer and spiritual growth. Benedictine monks lead three-day retreats during the weekends and during the week.
Chris Light at en.wikipedia
Located on 843 acres next to the scenic Blue Hills of Virginia, Longlea offers silent retreats conducted by priests of Opus Dei for either men or women. Mothers with young babies are welcome — each year two retreats are designated to accommodate infants.
Courtesy of Longlea
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In 1777, some two years into the American Revolutionary War, the British commander-in-chief General Sir William Howe launched the Philadelphia campaign to capture the rebels' capital and persuade them to sue for peace. In the fall of that year, Howe inflicted two significant defeats on General George Washington and his Continental Army, at Brandywine and Germantown, and occupied Philadelphia, forcing the Second Continental Congress to hurriedly decamp to York, Pennsylvania.   Washington avoided battle for the rest of the year, and in December he withdrew to winter quarters at Valley Forge, despite the desire of Congress that he continue campaigning.    In comparison, his subordinate General Horatio Gates had won major victories in September and October at the Battles of Saratoga.  Washington was criticized in some quarters within the army and Congress for relying on a Fabian strategy to wear the British down in a long war of attrition instead of defeating it decisively in a pitched battle. 
In November, Washington was hearing rumors of a "Strong Faction" within Congress that favored replacing him with Gates as commander-in-chief.  The congressional appointments of the known critic General Thomas Conway as Inspector General of the Army and of Gates to the Board of War and Ordnance in December convinced Washington there was a conspiracy to take command of the army from him.  [b] Over a winter in which supplies were scarce and deaths from disease accounted for 15 per cent of his force, he battled to keep both the army from dissolution and his position as its commander-in-chief.  He successfully waged a "clever campaign of political infighting"  in which he presented a public image of disinterest, a man without guile or ambition, while working through his allies in Congress and the army to silence his critics.   Nevertheless, the doubts about his leadership remained, and he needed success on the battefield if he was to be sure of his position. 
The British, meanwhile, had failed to eliminate the Continental Army and force a decisive end to the American rebellion, despite investing significant resources in North America to the detriment of defenses elsewhere in the empire.  In Europe, France was maneuvering to exploit the opportunity to weaken a long-term rival. Following the Franco-American alliance of February 1778, French forces were sent to North America to support the revolutionaries. This led to the Anglo-French War (1778–1783), which Spain would join on the French side in 1779. With the rest of Europe moving towards a hostile neutrality, Great Britain would come under further pressure in 1780 when the Dutch allied with France, leading to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Faced with military escalation, increasing diplomatic isolation and limited resources, the British were forced to prioritize the defense of the homeland and more valuable colonial possessions in the Caribbean and India above their North American colonies. They abandoned their efforts to win a decisive military victory, repealed the Intolerable Acts which had precipitated the rebellion and, in April 1778, sent the Carlisle Peace Commission in an attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. In Philadelphia, the newly installed commander-in-chief General Sir Henry Clinton was ordered to redeploy 8,000 troops, a third of his army, to the West Indies and Florida, consolidate the rest of his army in New York and adopt a defensive posture.   
Continental Army Edit
Washington's preference for a professional standing army rather than a militia had been another source of criticism.  He had seen his army dissolve in the fall of 1775 as short-term enlistments expired, and blamed his defeat in the Battle of Long Island in August 1776 in part on a poorly performing militia.  At his urging, Congress passed legislation between September and December 1776 to create an army in which troops would enlist for the duration. Recruitment failed to raise sufficient numbers, and the harsh discipline implemented by Washington, the long periods away from home and the defeats of 1777 further weakened the army through desertions and frequent officer resignations.
Although the army that went into Valley Forge contained the kernel of regimental organization and a core of experienced officers and men, no-one was under any illusion that it was a match for the tactical skill of the British Army.  The situation improved measurably with the arrival in March 1778 of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, to whom Washington gave the responsibility for training the army. With the commander-in-chief's enthusiastic support, Steuben implemented a uniform standard of drill where none had previously existed and worked the army hard, transforming it into a more professional force that might compete on equal terms with the British Army.   [c]
On May 21, Major General Charles Lee rejoined the Continental Army. Lee was a former British Army officer who had retired to Virginia before the revolution and had been touted as a potential commander of the army alongside Washington when war broke out. He had been captured in December 1776 following Washington's defeat at New York, and had been released in April in a prisoner exchange. He had been critical of Washington's indecisiveness at New York and insubordinate during the retreat from the city. But Washington had regarded him as his most trusted adviser and the best officer in the Continental Army, and he eagerly welcomed Lee back as his second-in-command.   
Sixteen months in captivity had not mellowed Lee. He remained respectful to Washington's face but continued to be critical about the commander-in-chief's abilities to others, and it is likely that Washington's friends reported this back to Washington.   Lee was dismissive of the Continental Army, denigrated Steuben's efforts to improve it and went over Washington's head to submit to Congress a plan to reorganize it on a militia basis, prompting Washington to reprove him.  Nevertheless, Lee was respected by many of Washington's officers and held in high esteem by Congress, and Washington gave him command of the division that would soon lead the Continental Army out of Valley Forge.  
In April, before news of the French alliance reached him, Washington issued a memorandum to his generals seeking their opinions on three possible alternatives for the upcoming campaign: attack the British in Philadelphia, shift operations to New York or remain on the defensive at Valley Forge and continue to build up the army. Of the twelve responses, all agreed it was vital that, whatever course was chosen, the army had to perform well if public support for the revolution was to be maintained after the disappointments of the previous year. Most generals supported one or other of the offensive options, but Washington sided with the minority, among them Steuben, who argued the Continental Army still needed improvement at Valley Forge before it was ready to take on the British. After news of the Franco-American alliance arrived and as British activity in and around Philadelphia increased, Washington met with ten of his generals on May 8 to further discuss plans. This time they unanimously favored the defensive option and waiting until the British intentions became clearer. 
In May, it became evident that the British were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia, but Washington still had no detailed knowledge of Clinton's intentions and was concerned that the British would slip away overland through New Jersey. The 2nd New Jersey Regiment, which had been conducting operations against British foragers and sympathizers in New Jersey since March, was a valuable source of intelligence, and by the end of the month a British evacuation by land looked increasingly likely. Washington reinforced the regiment with the rest of the New Jersey Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General William Maxwell, with orders to obstruct and harry British activities.  The Continentals were to co-operate with the experienced New Jersey militia, commanded by Major General Philemon Dickinson, one of the most capable militia commanders of the war and Washington's single best source of intelligence on British activities.  On May 18, Washington sent the inexperienced, 20-year-old Major General Lafayette with 2,200 men to establish an observation post at Barren Hill, eleven miles (eighteen kilometers) from Philadelphia. The Frenchman's first significant independent command almost ended in disaster for him two days later in the Battle of Barren Hill, and only the discipline of his men prevented his entrapment by the British. 
On June 15, the British began to withdraw from Philadelphia, crossing the River Delaware into New Jersey. The last troops crossed three days later, and the army consolidated around Haddonfield. Clinton, who had not yet decided on the exact route to New York approximately ninety miles (one hundred forty-five kilometers) away, divided his army into two divisions and set out for Allentown, some forty miles (sixty-four kilometers) to the northeast. He accompanied the first division, which comprised some 10,000 troops under the command of Lieutenant General Charles Lord Cornwallis. The second division, commanded by Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, comprised just over 9,000 personnel, of which over 7,500 were combatants. This division contained the bulk of the slow-moving heavy transport of the 1,500-wagon baggage train. 
The march was conducted in short segments during a heat wave in which temperatures frequently exceeded 90 °F (32 °C), which further slowed progress and caused casualties from heat exhaustion. The slow progress did not concern Clinton. He was confident his troops were more than a match for Washington's forces and felt that a major battle would compensate for the humiliation of having to abandon Philadelphia and might even deal a serious blow to the rebellion.   Wherever possible, the two divisions followed parallel routes which allowed them to be mutually supporting. Light troops and pioneers screened the route ahead of the main force and cleared obstacles, combat units were embedded with the baggage train and battalion-sized units provided flank guards.  The frequent sniping and skirmishing of Maxwell's Continentals and Dickinson's militia, and their attempts to obstruct and hinder the British by blocking roads, destroying bridges and spoiling wells, did not materially impede progress.  
On June 24, the first division arrived at Allentown while the second reached Imlaystown, four miles (six kilometers) to the east.  Clinton decided to head for Sandy Hook, from where the Royal Navy could ferry his army to New York. When the march resumed at 04:00 the next day, the road network made it impossible for the two divisions to follow separate routes and still remain within supporting distance of each other. Knyphausen's second division led the twelve-mile (nineteen-kilometer) column on the road towards Monmouth Court House (modern-day Freehold). Cornwallis followed, Guards and Grenadiers at the rear, putting his combat-heavy division between the baggage train and the likely direction of attack. At the end of the day, Knyphausen camped at Freehold Township, some four miles (six kilometers) from Monmouth Court House, while Clinton established his headquarters at Robin's Rising Sun Tavern, twelve miles (nineteen kilometers) from Knyphausen.  
The next day, June 26, the British suffered almost forty casualties in near-constant skirmishing in which one unit came close to being overrun. Knyphausen reached Monmouth Court House early that morning, and by 10:00 the entire column had concentrated there. It was clear to Clinton that Washington's forces were gathering in numbers, and the British were exhausted after their sixty-seven-mile (one-hundred-eight-kilometer) march from Philadelphia. Monmouth Court House offered a good defensive position, and it is possible that Clinton saw an opportunity for the battle he desired. He deployed his army to cover all approaches and decided to rest his troops for the next two nights. The bulk of his force, the first division, was deployed on the Allentown road, covering the second division in the village. 
The revolution had precipitated a vicious civil war in Monmouth County that did credit to neither side and which would continue after the armies had departed.  It was fought between Patriots, who sided with the rebellion, and Loyalists, who remained loyal to Great Britain and even formed units, such as the Queen's American Rangers, which fought alongside the British Army.  The two sides also fought each other in the civil arena, and it is estimated that fifty per cent of Monmouth County families suffered significant harm to person or property during the war.  By spring 1778, the formerly loyalist Monmouth Court House had come under patriot control.  When the British arrived, they found themselves in an enemy settlement that had been largely deserted by its inhabitants. Clinton's orders against pillaging were ignored by the rank and file and went unenforced by the officers. British and Hessian soldiers acting out of frustration and anger, and Loyalists acting out of rage and vengeance, committed numerous acts of vandalism, looting and arson. By the time Clinton resumed the march on June 28, thirteen of the village's near two dozen buildings had been destroyed, all of them Patriot owned. 
Washington learned the British were evacuating Philadelphia on June 17. He immediately convened a war council, at which all but two of seventeen generals believed the Continental Army still could not win a pitched battle against the British, Lee arguing it would be criminal to attempt one. Unsure of Clinton's exact intentions and with his officers urging caution, Washington determined to pursue the British and move to within striking distance. Lee's brigades led the Continental Army out of Valley Forge on the afternoon of June 18, and four days later the last troops crossed the Delaware into New Jersey at Coryell's Ferry.   Washington divided his army into two wings commanded by Lee and Major General Lord Stirling and a reserve commanded by Lafayette. Traveling light, Washington reached Hopewell on June 23, less than twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) north of the British at Allentown. While the army set up camp, Colonel Daniel Morgan was ordered south with 600 light infantry to reinforce Maxwell and Dickinson. 
On June 24, Dickinson informed Washington the efforts he and Maxwell were making to slow Clinton were having little impact, and that he believed Clinton was deliberately lingering in New Jersey to provoke a battle.  Washington convened another war council in which the twelve officers who attended all recommended varying degrees of caution. Lee argued that a victory would be of little benefit while a defeat would do irrevocable damage to the revolutionary cause. He preferred not to risk the Continental Army against a professional, well-trained enemy until French intervention swayed the odds in the Americans' favor and proposed that Clinton should be allowed to proceed to New York unmolested. Four other generals agreed. Even the most aggressive of the remainder wanted to avoid a major engagement Brigadier General Anthony Wayne suggested the dispatch of 2,500–3,000 additional troops to reinforce Maxwell and Dickinson that would enable them, with a third of the army, to make "an Impression in force." In the end, a compromise was agreed in which 1,500 picked men [d] would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve." To Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who attended as an aide, the council "would have done honor to the most honorab[le] society of midwives, and to them only." A disappointed Washington sent the token force under the command of Brigadier General Charles Scott. 
Soon after the council adjourned, Wayne – who had refused to put his name to the compromise – Lafayette and Major General Nathanael Greene contacted Washington individually with the same plea for a stronger vanguard action supported by the main body, while still avoiding a major battle. Lafayette assured Washington that Steuben and Brigadier General Louis Duportail agreed, and told Washington it "would be disgraceful for the leaders and humiliating for the troops to allow the enemy to cross the Jerseys with impunity." Greene emphasized the political aspect, advising Washington the public expected him to attack and that even if a limited attack did lead to a major battle, he thought their chances of success were good. It was all Washington, keen to erase the defeats of the previous year and prove his critics wrong, needed to hear. By the early hours of June 25 he had ordered Wayne to follow Scott with another 1,000 picked men. He wanted to do more than simply harass Clinton and, while still avoiding the risk of a major battle, hoped to inflict a heavy blow on the British, one that would surpass his success at the Battle of Trenton in 1776.  
Reining in Lafayette Edit
Washington offered Lee command of the vanguard, but Lee declined, stating the force was too small for a man of his rank and position. [e] Washington appointed Lafayette instead, with orders to attack "with the whole force of your command" if the opportunity presented itself. Lafayette failed to establish full control of the disparate forces under his command, and in his haste to catch the British, he pushed his troops to breaking point and outran his supplies. Washington grew increasingly concerned, and on the morning of June 26 he warned Lafayette not to "distress your men by an over hasty march." By that afternoon, Lafayette was at Robin's Tavern, where Clinton had stayed the previous night. He was within three miles of the British, too far away from the main army for it to support him, and his men were exhausted and hungry. He remained eager to fight and discussed with his officers a night march with the intention of striking Clinton the next morning. 
That evening, Washington ordered Lafayette to leave Morgan and the militia behind as a screen and move to Englishtown, where he would be back in range of both supplies and the main army.  [f] By this time Lee, having realized Lafayette's force was more significant than he first thought, had changed his mind and requested command of it. Washington ordered Lee to take Scott's former brigade and the brigade of Brigadier General James Varnum, link up with Lafayette in Englishtown and take command of all advance forces. Greene took over command of Lee's wing of the main body.  [g] By June 27, Lafayette was safely back in the fold with what was now Lee's vanguard of some 4,500 troops [h] at Englishtown, six miles (ten kilometers) from the British at Monmouth Court House. Washington was with the main body of just over 7,800 troops and the bulk of the artillery at Manalapan Bridge, four miles (six kilometers) behind Lee.  Morgan's light infantry, now increased to 800 men by the addition of a militia detachment, was at Richmond Mills, a little over two miles (three kilometers) to the south of Monmouth Court House.  [i] Dickinson's 1,200 or more militia were on Clinton's flanks, with a significant concentration about two miles (three kilometers) west of Monmouth Court House. 
On the afternoon of June 27, Washington conferred with the vanguard's senior officers at Englishtown but did not offer a battle plan. Lee believed he had full discretion on whether and how to attack and called his own war council after Washington left. He intended to advance as soon as he knew Clinton was on the move, in the hope of catching the British rearguard when it was most vulnerable. In the absence of any intelligence about Clinton's intentions or the terrain, Lee believed it would be useless to form a precise plan of his own he told his commanders only to be ready for action at short notice and follow his orders.   In response to a written order received from Washington in the early hours of June 28, Lee ordered Colonel William Grayson to take 700 men forward. They were to watch for any British move and, if one did occur, try and slow them to give the vanguard time to close the distance. 
Grayson did not depart Englishtown until 06:00, an hour after news arrived that Clinton was on the move.  Both vanguard and main body broke camp immediately, and both were slow to move the vanguard was delayed when brigades formed up in the wrong march order and the main body was slowed by its artillery train.  At 07:00, Lee rode ahead to scout the situation for himself. Following some confusion when a militia rider erroneously reported the British were not withdrawing but preparing to attack, Lee learned that the British had begun moving at 02:00 and only a small party of infantry and cavalry remained in the area. 
Clinton's first move had been to deploy the Queen's Rangers northwest of Monmouth Court House to cover the departure of the second division, scheduled for an hour later but delayed until 04:00. By 05:00, the first division had begun moving, and the last British troops left Monmouth Court House by 09:15, heading northeast on the road to Middletown. Trailing the column was the rearguard, comprising a battalion of light infantry and a regiment of dragoons which, with the Rangers, totaled 1,550–2,000 troops.  
Advance to contact Edit
The first shots were exchanged around 08:00 in an entirely American skirmish between a small detachment of Rangers and Dickinson's militia. Grayson arrived just in time to deploy his troops in support of the militia near a bridge over a ravine and watch the Rangers withdraw.  [j] The bridge was on the Englishtown–Monmouth Court House road and spanned the Spotswood Middle Brook, one of three ravines bordered by marshy wetlands or 'morasses' that cut through what would soon become a battlefield. Other than by bridge, the ravines were negotiable with difficulty by infantry and not at all by artillery any unit cut off on the wrong side or pinned up against them would find itself in grave danger. When Lee caught up with Grayson shortly after the skirmish, Dickinson, who still believed the British occupied Monmouth Court House in force, strongly urged him not to venture across the brook. With intelligence about British activity still contradictory, Lee lost an hour at the bridge. He did not advance until Lafayette arrived with the rest of the vanguard.  
Once the vanguard was concentrated at the bridge, Lee replaced Grayson with Wayne to command the approximately 550-man lead element, which comprised detachments led by Colonel Richard Butler, Colonel Henry Jackson and Grayson (returned to the command of his original composite battalion of Virginians), supported by four artillery.   The vanguard advanced along the Englishtown road towards Monmouth Court House until it reached the junction with the road north to Foreman's Mill at around 09:30. Lee went forward with Wayne to reconnoiter Monmouth Court House, where they discovered the British rearguard. Estimating the British strength at some 2,000 men, Lee decided on a plan to hook round to their rear. He left Wayne with orders to fix the rearguard in place and returned to the rest of the vanguard to lead it on a left flanking maneuver. Lee's confidence crept into reports back to Washington that implied "the certainty of success." 
After Lee departed, Butler's detachment exchanged fire with mounted troops screening the rearguard, prompting the British to begin withdrawing to the northeast, towards the main column. In the subsequent pursuit, Wayne repulsed a charge by British dragoons and launched a feint against the British infantry, prompting the rearguard to halt and form up on a hill at the junction of the Middletown and Shrewsbury roads.  Meanwhile, because Lee was leading the rest of the vanguard himself, he neglected to provide Scott and Maxwell with a detailed plan.  After a two-mile (three-kilometer) march, he emerged from some woods at around 10:30, in time to witness Wayne's troops in action to his left. 
When it became evident the British were present in considerably larger numbers than he had anticipated, Lee operated with Lafayette to secure what he considered to be a vulnerable right flank. On the left flank, the appearance of another British force 2,000–3,000 strong prompted Jackson to pull his regiment back from its isolated position on the banks of Spotswood North Brook.  In the vanguard center, Scott and Maxwell, who was to Scott's left, were not in communication with Lee and not privy to his plan. They felt increasingly isolated watching Lee push out the right flank, and with British troops marching towards Monmouth Court House to their south, they became apprehensive about being cut off. They agreed between themselves to adjust their positions Scott fell back a short distance southwest across the Spotswood Middle Brook to a more defensible position while Maxwell pulled back with the intention of circling round and coming up on Scott's right flank.  
Lee was dumbfounded when the two staff officers he had sent with orders for Scott returned with the news that he was nowhere to be found and disconcerted by their reports of the British returning in force. When he observed part of Lafayette's force retreating after a failed attempt to silence some British artillery, it appeared to Lee that the right flank too was pulling back without orders. It had become clear that he was losing control of the vanguard, and with his immediate command now only 2,500 strong, he realized his plan to envelop the British rearguard was finished. His priority now was the safety of his command in the face of superior numbers. 
Counter-attack and retreat Edit
As soon as he received news that his rearguard was being probed, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to march the first division back towards Monmouth Court House. He believed Washington's main body was not close enough to come up in support and that the terrain would make it difficult for Lee to maneuver. He intended to do more than simply defend his baggage train he thought the vanguard was vulnerable, and saw an opportunity to turn its right flank, just as Lee had feared, and destroy it.  After pausing at Monmouth Court House, Clinton began to push westwards. He formed his best troops into two columns, Guards on the right, Grenadiers on the left and the guns of the Royal Artillery between them, while a regiment of dragoons ranged about them. The infantry of the 3rd and 4th Brigades followed in line, while the 5th Brigade remained in reserve at Monmouth Court House. The Queen's Rangers and the infantry of the rearguard operated on the British right flank. To the rear, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers remained in a defensive line to which Clinton could fall back if things went badly.  In total, his force comprised some 10,000 troops. 
Lee ordered a general retreat to a line about one mile (two kilometers) to the west of Monmouth Court House that ran from Craig's House, north of Spotswood Middle Brook, to Ker's House, south of the brook. He had significant difficulties communicating with his subordinates and exhausted his aides attempting to do so. Although he arrived in the vicinity of Ker's house with a sizeable force by noon, he was unable to exercise command and control of it as a unified organization. As disorganized as the retreat was for Lee, at unit level it was generally conducted with a discipline that did credit to Steuben's training. The Americans suffered only some one dozen casualties as they fell back, an indication of how little major fighting there was there were no organized volleys by infantry muskets, and only the artillery engaged in any significant action.  Lee believed he had conducted a model "retrograde manoeuver in the face and under fire of an enemy" and claimed his troops moved with "order and precision." [k] He had remained calm during the retreat but began to unravel at Ker's house. When two of Washington's aides informed Lee that the main body was still some two miles (three kilometers) away and asked him what to report back, Lee replied "that he really did not know what to say."  Crucially, he failed to keep Washington informed of the retreat. 
Lee realized that a knoll in front of his lines would give the British, now deployed from column into line formation, command of the ground and render his position untenable. With no knowledge of the main body's whereabouts and believing he had little choice, Lee decided to fall back farther, across the Spotswood Middle Brook bridge. He believed he would be able to hold the British there from Perrine's Hill until the main body came up in support. With his aides out of action, Lee pressed whomever he could find into service as messengers to organize the withdrawal. It was during this period that he sent the army auditor, Major John Clark, to Washington with news of the retreat. But Washington was by now aware, having learned from Lee's troops who had already crossed the ravine.  
Washington's arrival Edit
The main body had reached Englishtown at 10:00, and by noon it was still some four miles (six kilometers) from Monmouth Court House. Without any recent news from Lee, Washington had no reason to be concerned. At Tennent's Meeting House, some two miles (three kilometers) east of Englishtown, he ordered Greene to take Brigadier General William Woodford's brigade of some 550 men and 4 artillery pieces south then east to cover the right flank. The rest of the main body continued east along the Englishtown–Monmouth Court House road. In the space of some ten minutes, Washington's confidence gave way to alarm as he encountered a straggler bearing the first news of Lee's retreat and then whole units in retreat. None of the officers Washington met could tell him where they were supposed to be going or what they were supposed to be doing. As the commander-in-chief rode on ahead, over the bridge and towards the front line, he saw the vanguard in full retreat but no sign of the British. At around 12:45, Washington found Lee marshalling the last of his command across the middle morass, marshy ground southeast of the bridge. 
Expecting praise for a retreat he believed had been generally conducted in good order, Lee was uncharacteristically lost for words when Washington asked without pleasantries, "I desire to know, sir, what is the reason – whence arises this disorder and confusion?"  When he regained his composure, Lee attempted to explain his actions. He blamed faulty intelligence and his officers, especially Scott, for pulling back without orders, leaving him no choice but to retreat in the face of a superior force, and reminded Washington that he had opposed the attack in the first place.   Washington was not convinced "All this may be very true, sir," he replied, "but you ought not to have undertaken it unless you intended to go through with it."  Washington made it clear he was disappointed with Lee and rode off to organize the battle he felt his subordinate should have given. Lee followed at a distance, bewildered and believing he had been relieved of command.  [l]
With the main body still arriving and the British no more than one-half mile (one kilometer) away, Washington began to rally the vanguard to set up the very defenses Lee had been attempting to organize. The commander-in-chief directed Wayne to take three battalions and form a rearguard in the Point of Woods, south of the Spotswood Middle Brook, that could delay the British. He issued orders for the 2nd New Jersey Regiment and two smaller Pennsylvanian regiments to deploy on the slopes of Perrine's Hill, north of the brook overlooking the bridge they would be the rallying point for the rest of the vanguard and the position on which the main body would form. Washington offered Lee a choice: remain and command the rearguard, or fall back to and organize the main body. Lee opted for the former and, as Washington departed to take care of the latter, promised he would "be the last one to leave the field."  
American rearguard action Edit
Lee positioned himself with four guns supported by two infantry battalions on the crest of a hill to the right of Wayne. As the British advanced – Guards on the right, Grenadiers on the left – they passed the Point of Woods, oblivious to the Continentals concealed in them. Wayne's troops inflicted up to forty casualties. The Guards reacted as they were trained and with the support of the dragoons and some of the Grenadiers, crashed into the Americans at the charge. Within ten minutes, Wayne's three battalions were being chased back to the bridge. The rest of the Grenadiers, meanwhile, continued to advance on Lee's position, pushing the Continental artillery back to a hedgerow to which the two infantry battalions had already withdrawn. Another short, sharp fight ensued until Lee, seeing both flanks being turned, ordered his men to follow Wayne back across the bridge.  
As Lee and Wayne fought south of the Spotswood Middle Brook, Washington was deploying the main body on Perrine's Hill, northwest of the bridge across the brook. Stirling's wing had just taken up positions on the American left flank when its artillery started to engage troops of the British 3rd Brigade. Clinton had earlier ordered the brigade to move right, cross the brook and cut the vanguard's line of retreat at the bridge. After the infantry of the 42nd (Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot crossed the brook, they ran into three battalions of Scott's detachment retreating westwards. Under pressure from the Highlanders, the Continentals continued through an orchard to the safety of Stirling's line while Stirling's artillery forced the Highlanders back to the orchard. A second battalion of Highlanders and the 44th Regiment of Foot that had swung right and crossed the Spotswood North Brook were also persuaded by the artillery to retreat. Even farther to the right, an attempt to outflank Stirling's position by the Queen's Rangers and the light infantry of the rearguard lacked the strength to carry it through, and they too fell back to join the 3rd Brigade. 
At 13:30, Lee was one of the last American officers to withdraw across Spotswood Middle Brook. The rearguard action had lasted no more than thirty minutes, enough time for Washington to complete the deployment of the main body. When a battalion of Grenadiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Monckton chased Lee's troops over the bridge, the British found themselves facing Wayne's detachment reforming some 350 yards (320 m) away. As the Grenadiers advanced to engage Wayne they came under heavy fire from Stirling's artillery, another 350 yards (320 m) behind Wayne. Monckton became the highest-ranking British casualty of the day, and in the face of an unexpectedly strong enemy, the Grenadiers retreated back across the bridge to the hedgerow from which they had expelled Lee earlier. 
Washington had acted decisively to form a strong defensive position anchored on the right above the bridge on the Englishtown road and extending in a gentle curve one-half mile (one kilometer) up the slope of Perrine's Hill. When Lee joined it, Washington sent him with two battalions of Maxwell's New Jersey Brigade, around half of Scott's detachment and some other units of the former vanguard to form a reserve at Englishtown. The rest of the vanguard, which included the other half of Scott's detachment and most of Wayne's, remained with Washington.  [m] The infantry battle gave way to a two-hour artillery duel across the 1,200 yards (1,097 m) of no-man's land on either side of the brook, in which both sides suffered more casualties due to heat exhaustion than they did from enemy cannon. 
British withdrawal Edit
Clinton had lost the initiative. He saw no prospect of success assaulting a strong enemy position in the brutal heat, and decided to break off the engagement.  His first task was to bring in his isolated right flank – the 3rd Brigade, Rangers and light infantry still sheltering in the orchard north of Spotswood Middle Brook. While the Highlanders of the 42nd Regiment remained in place to cover the withdrawal, the remainder fell back across the brook to join the Grenadiers at the hedgerow. Around 15:45, while the withdrawal was in progress, Greene arrived with Woodford's brigade at Combs Hill overlooking the British left flank and opened fire with his artillery. Clinton was forced to withdraw his own artillery, bringing the cannonade with Washington's guns on Perrine's Hill to an end, and move the Grenadiers to sheltered ground at the north end of the hedgerow. 
At 16:30, Washington learned of 3rd Brigade's withdrawal and launched the first American offensive action in six hours. He ordered two battalions of picked men "to go and see what [you] could do with the enemy's right wing."  Only one battalion some 350 strong led by Colonel Joseph Cilley actually made it into action. Cilley made good use of cover along the Spotswood North Brook to close with and engage the 275–325 troops of the 42nd Regiment in the orchard. The Highlanders found themselves in a disadvantageous position and, with the rest of British right flank already departed, they had no reason to stay. They conducted a fighting retreat in good order with minimal casualties. To the British, the rebels were "unsuccessful in endeavouring to annoy." To the Americans, it was a significant psychological victory over one of the British Army's most feared regiments. 
As his right flank pulled back, Clinton issued orders for what he intended to be a phased general withdrawal back towards Monmouth Court House.  His subordinates misunderstood. Instead of waiting until the 3rd Brigade had rejoined before pulling back, all but the 1st Grenadier Battalion withdrew immediately, leaving it and the 3rd Brigade dangerously exposed. Washington was buoyed by what he saw of Cilley's attack, and although he lacked specific intelligence about what the British were doing, the fact that their artillery had gone quiet suggested they might be vulnerable. He ordered Wayne to conduct an opportunistic advance with a detachment of Pennsylvanians. 
Wayne's request for three brigades, some 1,300 men, was denied, and at 16:45 he crossed the bridge over Spotswood Middle Brook with just 400 troops of the Third Pennsylvania Brigade. [n] The Pennsylvanians caught the 650–700 men of the lone Grenadier battalion in the process of withdrawing, giving the British scant time to form up and receive the attack. The Grenadiers were "losing men very fast", Clinton wrote later, before the 33rd Regiment of Foot arrived with 300–350 men to support them. The British pushed back, and the Pennsylvanian Brigade began to disintegrate as it retreated to Parsonage farm. The longest infantry battle of the day ended when the Continental artillery on Combs Hill stopped the British counter-attack in its tracks and forced the Grenadiers and infantry to withdraw.  [o]
Washington planned to resume the battle the next day, and at 18:00 he ordered four brigades he had previously sent back to the reserve at Englishtown to return. When they arrived, they took over Stirling's positions on Perrine's Hill, allowing Stirling to advance across the Spotswood Middle Brook and take up new positions near the hedgerow. An hour later, Washington ordered a reinforced brigade commanded by Brigadier General Enoch Poor to probe Clinton's right flank while Woodford's brigade was to drop down from Combs Hill and probe Clinton's left flank. Their cautious advance was halted by sunset before making contact with the British, and the two armies settled down for the night within one mile (two kilometers) of each other, the closest British troops at Ker's House. 
While the battle was raging, Knyphausen had led the baggage train to safety. His second division endured only light harassment from militia along the way, and eventually set up camp some three miles (five kilometers) from Middletown. With the baggage train secure, Clinton had no intention of resuming the battle. At 23:00, he began withdrawing his troops. The first division slipped away unnoticed by Washington's forward troops and, after an overnight march, linked back up with Knyphausen's second division between 08:00 and 09:00 the next morning. 
On June 29, Washington withdrew his army to Englishtown, where they rested the next day. The British were in a strong position near Middletown, and their route to Sandy Hook was secure. They completed the march largely untroubled by a militia that considered the threat to have passed and had melted away to tend to crops. The last British troops embarked on naval transports on July 6, and the Royal Navy carried Clinton's army to New York. The timing was fortuitous for the British on July 11, a superior French fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Charles Henri Hector d'Estaing anchored off Sandy Hook. 
The battle was tactically inconclusive and strategically irrelevant neither side dealt a heavy blow to the other, and the Continental Army remained in the field while the British Army redeployed to New York, just as both would have if the battle had never been fought.  [p] Clinton reported 358 total casualties after the battle – 65 killed, 59 died of fatigue, 170 wounded and 64 missing. Washington counted some 250 British dead, a figure later revised to a little over 300. Using a typical 18th-century wounded-to-killed ratio of no more than four to one and assuming no more than 160 British dead caused by enemy fire, Lender and Stone calculate the number of wounded could have been up to 640. A Monmouth County Historical Association study estimates total British casualties at 1,134 – comprising 304 dead, 770 wounded and 60 prisoners. Washington reported his own casualties to be 370 – comprising 69 dead, 161 wounded and 140 missing. Using the same wounded-to-killed ratio and assuming a proportion of the missing were fatalities, Lender and Stone estimate Washington's casualties could have exceeded 500.  
Claims of victory Edit
In his post-battle report to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Clinton claimed he had conducted a successful operation to redeploy his army in the face of a superior force. The counter-attack was, he reported, a diversion intended to protect the baggage train and was ended on his own terms, though in private correspondence he conceded that he had also hoped to inflict a decisive defeat on Washington.  Having marched his army through the heart of enemy territory without the loss of a single wagon, he congratulated his officers on the "long and difficult retreat in the face of a greatly superior army without being tarnished by the smallest affront." While some of his officers showed a grudging respect for the Continental Army, their doubts were rooted not in the battlefield but in the realisation that the entry of France into the conflict had swung the strategic balance against Great Britain. 
For Washington, the battle was fought at a time of serious misgivings about his effectiveness as commander-in-chief, and it was politically important for him to present it as a victory.  On July 1, in his first significant communication to Congress from the front since the disappointments of the previous year, he wrote a full report of the battle. The contents were measured but unambiguous in claiming a significant win, a rare occasion on which the British had left the battlefield and their wounded to the Americans. Congress received it enthusiastically and voted a formal thanks to Washington and the army to honor "the important victory of Monmouth over the British grand army." 
In their accounts of the battle, Washington's officers invariably wrote of a major victory, and some took the opportunity to finally put an end to criticism of Washington Hamilton and Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, another of Washington's aides, wrote to influential friends – in the case of Laurens, his father Henry, President of the Continental Congress – praising Washington's leadership. The American press portrayed the battle as a triumph with Washington at its center. Governor William Livingston of New Jersey, who never came any nearer to Monmouth Court House during the campaign than Trenton, almost twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) away, published an anonymous 'eyewitness' account in the New Jersey Gazette only days after the battle, in which he credited the victory to Washington. Articles were still being published in a similar vein in August. 
Congressional delegates who were not Washington partisans, such as Samuel Adams and James Lovell, were reluctant to credit Washington but obliged to recognize the importance of the battle and keep to themselves any questions they might have had about the British success in reaching New York. The Washington loyalist Elias Boudinot wrote that "none dare to acknowledge themselves his Enemies."  Washington's supporters were emboldened in defending his reputation in July, Major General John Cadwalader challenged Conway, the officer at the center of what Washington had perceived to be a conspiracy to remove him as commander-in-chief, to a duel in Philadelphia in which Conway was wounded in the mouth. Thomas McKean, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, was perhaps the only congressional delegate to register his disapproval of the affair, but did not think it wise to bring Cadwalader up before the court to answer for it.   Faith in Washington had been restored, Congress became almost deferential to him, public criticism of him all but ceased and for the first time he was hailed as the Father of his Country. The epithet became commonplace by the end of the year, by which time the careers of most of his chief critics had been eclipsed or were in ruins.   
Lee's court martial Edit
Even before the day was out, Lee was cast in the role of villain, and his vilification became an integral part of the narrative Washington's lieutenants constructed when they wrote in praise of their commander-in-chief.  Lee continued in his post as second-in-command immediately after the battle, and it is likely that the issue would have simply subsided if he had let it go. But on June 30, after protesting his innocence to all who would listen, Lee wrote an insolent letter to Washington in which he blamed "dirty earwigs" for turning Washington against him, claimed his decision to retreat had saved the day and pronounced Washington to be "guilty of an act of cruel injustice" towards him. Instead of the apology Lee was tactlessly seeking, Washington replied that the tone of Lee's letter was "highly improper" and that he would initiate an official inquiry into Lee's conduct. Lee's response demanding a court-martial was again insolent Washington ordered his arrest and set about obliging him.   
The court convened on July 4, and three charges were laid before Lee: disobeying orders in not attacking on the morning of the battle, contrary to "repeated instructions" conducting an "unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat" and disrespect towards the commander-in-chief. The trial concluded on August 12, but the accusations and counter-accusations continued until the verdict was confirmed by Congress on December 5.  Lee's defense was articulate but fatally flawed by his efforts to turn it into a personal contest between himself and Washington. He denigrated the commander-in-chief's role in the battle, calling Washington's official account "from beginning to end a most abominable damn'd lie", and disingenuously cast his own decision to retreat as a "masterful manoeuvre" designed to lure the British onto the main body.  Washington remained aloof from the controversy, but his allies portrayed Lee as a traitor who had allowed the British to escape and linked him to the previous winter's alleged conspiracy against Washington. 
Although the first two charges proved to be dubious, [q] Lee was undeniably guilty of disrespect, and Washington was too powerful to cross.  As the historian John Shy noted, "Under the circumstances, an acquittal on the first two charges would have been a vote of no-confidence in Washington."  Lee was found guilty on all three counts, though the court deleted "shameful" from the second and noted the retreat was "disorderly" only "in some few instances." Lee was suspended from the army for a year, a sentence so lenient that some interpreted it as a vindication of all but the charge of disrespect.  Lee's fall from grace removed Washington's last significant critic from the army and the last realistic alternative to Washington as commander-in-chief, and silenced the last voice to speak in favor of a militia army. Washington's position as the "indispensable man" was now unassailable.  [r]
Assessing the Continental Army Edit
Joseph Bilby and Katherine Jenkins consider the battle to have marked the "coming of age" of a Continental Army that had previously achieved success only in small actions at Trenton and Princeton.  Their view is reflected by Joseph Ellis, who writes of Washington's belief that "the Continental Army was now a match for British professionals and could hold its own in a conventional, open-field engagement."  Mark Lender and Garry Stone point out that while the Continental Army was unquestionably improved under Steuben's tutelage, the battle did not test its ability to meet a professional European army in European-style warfare in which brigades and divisions maneuvered against each other. The only army to mount any major offensive operation on the day was British the Continental Army fought a largely defensive battle from cover, and a significant portion of it remained out of the fray on Perrine's Hill. The few American attacks, such as Cilley's, were small-unit actions. 
Steuben's influence was apparent in the way the rank and file conducted themselves. Half of the troops who marched onto the battlefield at Monmouth in June were new to the army, having been recruited only since January. The significant majority of Lee's vanguard comprised ad hoc battalions filled with men picked from numerous regiments. Without any inherent unit cohesion, their effectiveness depended on officers and men who had never before served together using and following the drills they had been taught. That they did so competently was demonstrated throughout the battle, in the advance to contact, Wayne's repulse of the dragoons, the orderly retreat in the face of a strong counter-attack and Cilley's attack on the Highlanders. The army was well served too by the artillery, which earned high praise from Washington.  The professional conduct of the American troops gained widespread recognition even among the British Clinton's secretary wrote, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did", and Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who as commander of the light infantry had traded blows with the Continentals, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not receiv'd such an one in America." 
In keeping with a battle that was more politically than militarily significant, the first reenactment in 1828 was staged to support the presidential candidacy of Andrew Jackson. In another attempt to reenact the battle in 1854, the weather added an authentic touch to the proceedings and the reenactment was called off due to the excessive heat. As the battle receded into history so too did its brutality, to be replaced by a sanitized romanticism. The public memory of the fighting was populated with dramatic images of heroism and glory, as epitomized by Emanuel Leutze's Washington Rallying the Troops at Monmouth.
The transformation was aided by the inventiveness of 19th-century historians, none more creative than Washington's step-grandson, George Washington Parke Custis, whose account of the battle was as artistic as Leutze's painting. Custis was inevitably derogatory towards Lee, and Lee's calumny achieved an orthodoxy in such works as Washington Irving's Life of George Washington (1855–1859) and George Bancroft's History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the American Continent (1854–1878). The role Lee had unsuccessfully advanced for the militia in the revolution was finally established in the poetic 19th-century popular narrative, in which the Continental Army was excised from the battle and replaced with patriotic citizen-soldiers. 
The battlefield remained largely undisturbed until 1853, when the Freehold and Jamesburg Agricultural Railroad opened a line that cut through the Point of Woods, across the Spotswood Middle Brook and through the Perrine estate. The area became popular with tourists, and the Parsonage, the site of Wayne's desperate battle with the Grenadiers and the 33rd Regiment, was a favorite attraction until it was demolished in 1860.  During the 19th century, forests were cleared and marshes drained, and by the early 20th century traditional agriculture had been replaced by orchards and truck farms.  In 1884, the Monmouth Battle Monument was dedicated outside the modern-day county courthouse in Freehold, near where Wayne's troops first brushed with the British rearguard.  In the mid 20th century, two battlefield farms were sold to builders, but before the land could be developed, lobbying by state officials, Monmouth County citizens, the Monmouth County Historical Association and the Monmouth County Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution succeeded in initiating a program of preservation. In 1963, the first tract of battlefield land came under state ownership with the purchase of a 200-acre farm. The Monmouth Battlefield State Park was dedicated on the bicentennial of the battle in 1978 and a new visitor center was opened in 2013. By 2015, the park encompassed over 1,800 acres, incorporating most of the land on which the afternoon battle was fought. The state park helped restore a more realistic interpretation of the history of the battle to the public memory, and the Continental Army takes its rightful place in the annual reenactments staged every June.   
Legend of Molly Pitcher Edit
Five days after the battle, a surgeon treating the wounded reported a patient's story of a woman who had taken her husband's place working a gun after he was incapacitated. Two accounts attributed to veterans of the battle that surfaced decades later also speak of the actions of a woman during the battle in one she supplied ammunition to the guns, in the other she brought water to the crews. The story gained prominence during the 19th century and became embellished as the legend of Molly Pitcher. The woman behind Molly Pitcher is most often identified as Mary Ludwig Hays, whose husband William served with the Pennsylvania State Artillery, but it is likely that the legend is an amalgam of more than one woman seen on the battlefield that day it was not unusual for camp followers to assist in 18th-century battles, though more plausibly in carrying ammunition and water than crewing the guns. Late 20th-century research identified a site near Stirling's artillery line as the location of a well from which the legendary Molly drew water, and a historic marker was placed there in 1992.  
Why Join Us?
It’s time to step back, experiment, explore, and have some fun. No forcing or pushing of thoughts. For just a few days, we'll let go of the rules and the routines-- old and new-- that have been making us feel unsteady, unsure, alone, and cloudy. This is the time to celebrate our own Natural potential.
We’ll mold the red clay, letting our hands become the driver. The forms reveal themselves to us. Pinching and rubbing and moving the brightly colored earth. We’ll take a breath.
We’ll move. Our attention lingering on how we feel throughout the practice. Nothing needs to look a certain way. We do what we do because it feels good. It feels right.
We celebrate how each beautiful vessel of a body takes its shape. Each clay form becomes something unlike any other. The more we create space for our natural forms to show themselves, the more creativity, joy and freedom will flow.
Adaptation is not easy. It requires a tremendous amount of emotional and mental effort to adjust to changes that exist outside of our control. We have had to tuck ourselves away into a physical, mental and emotional space that may have already felt restricted. To adapt to a ‘new normal,’ we are going to work with what life presents. For now, we will cocoon in our studios, and (just like the caterpillar!) holo-metabolize into our own unique forms.
Map of New Jersey’s Revolutionary History
Use the search functions below to explore American Revolution sites nearby or select a category for the type of places that interest you. If you are looking to take a tour of the area, some suggested itineraries and touring resources can be found on our Visit page.
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34 Grayrock Rd | Clinton, NJ, 08809
17 Von Steuben Ln. | South Bound Brook, NJ, 08880
S. Montgomery St | Trenton, NJ, 08608
83 Market Street | Salem , NJ, 08079
Rutgers University New Brunswick Campus | New Brunswick, NJ, 08854
400 Sycamore Ave | Shrewsbury, NJ, 07702
1824 Bolmer Farm Road | Bridgewater, NJ, 08807
907 Shore Rd | Somers Point, NJ, 08244
457 High Street | Burlington, NJ, 08016
31 Batsto Road | Hammonton, NJ, 08037
126 Morris Ave | Springfield Township, NJ, 07081
Rivervale Rd | River Vale, NJ, 07675
114 Dreahook Rd | Stanton, NJ, 08885
1073 East Jersey St. | Elizabeth, NJ, 07201
321 Easton Ave | New Brunswick, NJ, 08901
200 Old Halfway Rd | Barnegat, NJ, 08005
747 Old New York Road | Port Republic, NJ, 08241
380 Sycamore Avenue | Shrewsbury, NJ, 07702
1225 River Rd | Piscataway, NJ, 08854
Historic home of wealthy merchant in Piscataway
150 W. Main St. | Freehold, NJ, 07728
15 Front Street | Chesterfield, NJ, 08515
1097 Route 23 North | Wantage, NJ, 07461
Historic home and museum in Sussex County
199 Totowa Rd | Wayne, NJ, 07470
The home of Thuenis Dey, Colonel of the Bergen County Militia, and headquarters to General George Washington during July, October and November 1780.
602 West Front Street | Plainfield, New Jersey, 07060
Historic house museum in Plainfield, NJ
1050 River Rd | Piscataway Township, NJ, 08854
Interactive historic village in Piscataway
436 Moorestown-Mt. Laurel Rd. | Mt Laurel, NJ, 08054
42 Broad St. | Elizabeth, NJ, 07201
9 Bayard Street | New Brunswick, NJ, 08901
North Delaware Street and Clonmell Road | Paulsboro, NJ, 08066
Site of Fort Billingsport
Hudson Terrace | Fort Lee, NJ, 07024
1588 Palisade Avenue | Fort Lee, NJ, 07024
100 Hessian Ave. | National Park, NJ, 08063
101 Farnsworth Avenue | Bordentown, NJ, 08505
54 E Somerset St | Raritan, NJ, 08869
81 High St | Mt Holly, NJ , 08060
142 East Hanover Street | Trenton , NJ, 08608-1704
960 Ye Greate St | Greenwich, NJ, 08323
72 McBride Ave. | Paterson, NJ, 07501
343 Kings Hwy E | Haddonfield, NJ, 08033
Greenwich, NJ , 08323
3 Front St. | Hancock's Bridge, NJ
Route 202 | Montville, NJ, 07082
58 Livingston Avenue | New Brunswick, NJ, 08901
62 Longstreet Raod | Holmdel, NJ, 07728
58 N Broad St | Woodbury, NJ, 08096
233 Kings Highway | Haddonfield, NJ, 08033
63 Main St | Chatham, NJ, 07928
3055 River Road | Bedminster, NJ, 07921
540 Warren St. | Phillipsburg, NJ, 08865
| Toms River, NJ, 08753
459 High Street | Burlington City, NJ, 08016
1003 Morris Ave | Union, NJ, 07083
25 Old Parsippany Road | Parsippany, NJ, 07054
208 Broadway | Barnegat Light, NJ, 08006
1304 Sloatsburg Rd | Ringwood, NJ, 07456
79 Nassau St | Princeton, NJ, 08540
94 Main St | Matawan, NJ, 07747
137 Kings Hwy | Middletown, NJ, 07748
1281 River Rd | Piscataway Township, NJ, 08854
Business Route 33 | Manalapan, NJ, 07728
68 Morris Ave | Morristown, NJ , 07960
30 Washington Pl. | Morristown, NJ, 07960
55 Stockton Street | Princeton, NJ , 08540
345 Oak Hill Rd | Middletown, NJ, 07748
Princeton University | Princeton, NJ, 08540
52 Park Pl | Newark, NJ, 07102
205 West State Street | Trenton, NJ, 08608
The New Jersey State Museum is an interdisciplinary museum offering collections, exhibitions and programs in science, history and art. Among the exhibitions is "Remembering the Revolution" which includes a number of artifacts and artworks related to the American Revolution.
49 Washington St | Newark , NJ, 07102
26 Hadley Ave | Toms River, NJ, 08753
101 Barrack St | Trenton, NJ, 08608
71 Somerset St. | Somerville, NJ, 08876
92 Market St. | Salem, NJ, 08079
145 W Broad St | Burlington, NJ, 08016
448 Tennent Rd. | Manalapan, NJ, 07726
840 Front St. | Scotch Plains(07076), NJ, 07076
35 Washington Ave. | Oxford, NJ, 07863
1900 Park Blvd | Camden, NJ, 08103
790 E Commerce St | Bridgeton, NJ, 08302
500 Mercer Road | Princeton, NJ, 08540-4810
149 Kearny Ave | Perth Amboy, NJ, 08861
Pulaski Boulevard & Kosciusko Way | Little Egg Harbor, NJ, 08087
1304 Sloatsburg Rd | Ringwood, NJ, 07456
84 Laurel Ave | Kingston, NJ , 08528
140 N Warren St | Trenton, NJ, 08608
East Broadway | Salem, NJ, 08079
Gateway National Recreation Area | Sandy Hook, NJ, 07732
5 Olyphant Pl | Morristown, NJ, 07960
55 Main St. | Chatham, NJ, 07298
8 Belvidere Ave. | Oxford, NJ, 07863
12 High Street | Moorestown, NJ, 08057
7 River Rd | High Bridge, NJ, 08829
1000 Shore Rd | Somers Point, NJ, 08244
33 Throckmorton St | Freehold, NJ, 07728
1209 Main St | River Edge, NJ, 07661
470 Quaker Rd | Princeton, NJ, 08540
335 Franklin Turnpike | Ho-Ho-Kus, NJ, 07423
42 Broad St. | Elizabeth, NJ, 07201
Ye Greate St. | Greenwich Township, NJ , 08323
614 Greenbrook Rd | North Plainfield, New Jersey, 07063
Courtland Streets | Bordentown, NJ, 08505
Trenton , NJ , 08608
1208 Kings Hwy | Swedesboro, NJ, 08085
941 E. Main St. | Bridgewater, NJ, 08807
3026 Belvidere Rd. | Phillipsburg, NJ, 08865
533 Berdan Ave. | Wayne, NJ, 07470
9 Van Veghten Rd. | Bridgewater, NJ, 08807
Water Street | Englishtown, NJ, 07726
62 Walnford Road | Upper Freehold, NJ, 08501
355 Washington Crossing Pennington Rd | Titusville, NJ, 08560
W South Orange Ave | Short Hills, NJ, 07078
100 Hessian Ave | National Park, NJ, 08063
Tempe Wick Rd. | Morristown, NJ, 07960
15 Market St | Trenton, NJ, 08611
The Trent House was occupied during the Revolutionary War period by both Patriots and Tories. Hessian troops were quartered on the site and a hospital for injured from both sides was operated by Dr. William Bryant, a Tory. From 1778 to 1792 Colonel John Cox, Assistant Quartermaster General for the Continental Army, owned the house.
18 Hollybrook Dr | Little Egg Harbor Township, NJ, 08087